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1 Introducing the Theme
Autonomy is generally regarded as the fundamental right of individuals to shape their 
own future through voluntary action. In private law, it is associated with freedom of 
contract and the concept of casum sentit dominus (the loss lies where it falls). As such, 
it is opposed to legal paternalism, briefl y defi ned as instances in which legislation or 
the courts interfere with the individual’s decision-making process on the grounds that 
otherwise decisions will not be made in the individual’s own best interests.
 Traditionally, legislation protecting the estate of minors and mentally disabled 
individuals against the consequences of their actions is considered the prime example 
of paternalism.1 However, such protection against the risks of succumbing to weakness 
and extortionary practices is nowadays ubiquitous in Western society. The level of 
protection differs from domain to domain. The prohibition of trading in humans as a 
commodity – ranging from slavery to prostitution and selling organs – seems to have 
little in common with restrictions on freedom of contract in marital and family issues or 
with gambling regulation, but the essential commonality is the substitution of voluntary 
individual decision-making with the decision that the legislator or court fi nds the most 
appropriate.
 Obviously, there is no strict defi nition of paternalism. Indeed, the defi nitions used 
may provide an indication of the author’s own views. If paternalism is defi ned in terms 
of governments assuming the power to determine what is best for citizens because the 
latter cannot be trusted to make decisions in their own best interests, it may be concluded 
that the author is somewhat sceptical of such state intervention.2
 Some defi ne paternalism as coercive intervention with the behaviour of individuals 
in order to prevent them from causing harm to themselves.3 Some authors focus on 
the grounds of justifi cation for intervention as the defi ning element in paternalism: 
state intervention is paternalistic if it purports to increase the individual’s welfare and 
happiness or to further his or her interests, needs and values.4
 The authority for interfering is thought by some to lie in the mere coercive powers of 
the state,5 whereas others take a more sophisticated approach by arguing that paternalism 
may be founded on a hypothetical contract with the individual.6
2 Defi ning Paternalism
As far as terminology is concerned, different subcategorisations are used.7 ‘Pure 
paternalism’ is distinguished from ‘impure paternalism’, where the former is aimed 
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1 E. Zamir, ‘The Effi ciency of Paternalism’ (1998) 84 Virginia L. Rev. 238, n. 25.
2 A. Ogus, Costs and Cautionary Tales – Economic Insights for the Law (2006) at 83.
3 E.G. Valdés, ‘On Justifying Legal Paternalism’(1990) Ratio Juris 173 ff.
4 G. Dworkin, ‘Paternalism’ in R.A. Wasserstrom (ed.), Morality and the Law (1971) at 108. Cf. Zamir, 
above n. 1, at 236.
5 D. Kennedy, ‘Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to 
Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power’ (1982) 41 Maryland L. Rev. 563 at 572.
6 Ogus, above n. 2, at 234.
7 Further categories to be found in G. Dworkin, ‘Moral Paternalism’ (2005) 24 Law and Philosophy 305 ff.
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directly at the person that is assumed to be in need of protection whereas the latter calls 
for the intervention of a gatekeeper. ‘Impure paternalism’, therefore, involves not only 
the protectee but also a third party who owes a legal duty to ensure the protectee is 
separated from a source of danger.8 Here we can think of the bartender who is legally 
obliged not to sell alcohol to a person under a certain age or an already intoxicated 
customer.
 Another categorisation relates to the distinction between ‘strong paternalism’ and 
‘weak paternalism’. Weak paternalism refers to soft state intervention aimed at educating 
and informing and infl uencing the decision-making process, thus ‘nudging’ individuals 
towards what are perceived to be better outcomes. Law is often used as an instrument to 
this end – e.g., information duties and the duty to frame information in a certain fashion 
– and is considered an alternative to state information campaigns and so forth.
 Strong paternalism by nature is more interventionist. Its mission is not merely to 
inform or even to persuade but to ensure that individual behaviour that leads to adverse 
consequences is altered or stopped if necessary. It focuses on changing preferences 
rather than informing individuals of the pros and cons of their preferences.9 As such, it 
is associated with mandatory law.10 It is ius cogens rather than ius dispositivum.11
 In the law of contracts and torts, weak paternalism seems to be on the increase. By 
nudging the protectee in a certain direction it is thought that the law helps to overcome 
bounded rationality and the infl uence of biases, heuristics and cravings.12 Rather than 
forbidding certain activities, information rules or default rules are construed in such a 
way as to help the individual make the decision that maximises his or her welfare. By 
using powerful warning signs, the owner of dangerous premises can nudge potential 
victims into avoiding the premises. By using default contract law rules, a legislator can 
nudge contracting parties in a specifi c direction if, in practice, these rules are never the 
subject of contract negotiations.13
 By way of example, consider the following sliding scale between autonomy and 
paternalism in private law:
Autonomy Weak paternalism: 
nudging
Strong paternalism: 
intervention
Casum sentit 
dominus 
(D.50, 17, 23) 
Duty to inform 
against risks
Duty to warn against 
risks
Prohibition of certain 
acts, duty to intervene 
in personal sphere of 
other person
Contracts are 
binding
Information 
duties aimed at 
optimal informed 
decision-making 
Cooling-off periods Mandatory standards 
for content or 
conclusion of contract
Related to paternalism, but perhaps conceptually best kept distinct from it, are measures 
that, though intended to enhance individual welfare, are also aimed at social welfare 
generally. This is because the decisions made by the individual have spillover effects for 
the rest of society, or externalities, as they are sometimes called.14 Thus, for example, 
the mandatory wearing of seat belts in vehicles or the (usually softy) measures taken to 
8 Dworkin, above n. 4, at 111.
9 G. Dworkin, ‘Paternalism’ in E.N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2002) at 1.
10 Ogus, above n. 2, at 85.
11 B. Rudden, ‘Ius Cogens, Ius Dispositivum’ (1980) 11 Cambrian Law Review 87 at 87 ff.
12 On the concept of nudging, see e.g. R.H. Thaler and C.R. Sunstein, Nudge – Improving Decisions About 
Health, Wealth, and Happiness (2008) at 1 ff. Note that here we witness a cultural gap between the United 
States and Europe. Had Thaler and Sunstein originated from Europe, they would probably not have chosen 
the catchword ‘nudging’, as it would surely be associated with the cheeky ‘nudge nudge, wink wink’ Monty 
Python sketch.
13 C.R. Sunstein and R.H. Thaler, ‘Libertarian Paternalism is Not an Oxymoron’ (2003) 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
1159 ff.
14 A. Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (1994) at 35-38.
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curtail tobacco smoking may appear to be principally concerned with reducing the risk 
of harm for the individual concerned but can be justifi ed by reference to the public purse, 
because most health care costs are borne by the community as a whole.15 Individual 
autonomy may thus be curtailed for the benefi t of the greater good.16
3 Cost and Benefi ts of Autonomy and Paternalism
Appraising the relative costs and benefi ts of autonomy and paternalism is fraught with 
diffi culties, but establishing a framework for this purpose can at least facilitate good 
policy-making.17 Take, fi rst of all, the costs of paternalism. If mandatory paternalism 
is introduced without regulating price, the private party burdened with executing the 
paternalistic intervention (e.g. gatekeepers) will surely consider charging the protectee 
for the paternalism.18 Such transferral of cost may cause the price of the product to 
rise and may ultimately cause the product to become unaffordable for individuals on 
lower incomes.19 This mechanism in itself does not make paternalism the equivalent of 
redistribution,20 unless the cost increase is distributed equally among all those buying 
the product.
 Some other important costs of paternalism should also be mentioned. As regards hard 
paternalism, there will be some individuals who will lose out by being deprived of the 
ability to make alternative choices, because their preferences are different from those 
assumed by the legal policy-makers. Quite apart from this, there is also the possibility 
that the latter will make errors in deciding what is best for the individuals concerned, 
perhaps because of undue political pressures.
 Such costs may be diffi cult to quantify, but it is still easier than measuring the benefi ts 
of paternalist measures. What does society gain by protecting the patrimonial interests 
of the weak and feeble? What does society gain by protecting inexperienced investors 
against market forces by imposing a duty on banks to check customers’ fi nancial 
situation?
 Surely, the benefi ts must be found in some fundamental value of human autonomy. By 
turning to paternalism, the individual is protected in order to avoid a more catastrophic 
fate from materialising. However, this does not preclude an effort towards a more 
objective measurement. How much is society willing to spend (or forego in terms of 
welfare increases) in order to protect specifi c groups of individuals?
 On the other hand, paternalism also has a political cost. In modern times, it is not 
consistent with political correctness. Politicians, courts and policy-makers do not like 
their products to be branded as interventionist and meddlesome, and the ‘p-word’ is 
almost always used in a pejorative sense when used in public debates.21 In reality, 
however, ‘contrary to the prevailing rhetoric of policymakers (and much of the legal 
literature), the legal systems of all western liberal democracies contain innumerable 
paternalistic rules and doctrines.’22
 Therefore, the extent to which a given society is willing to allow paternalist 
intervention tells us a great deal about the dominant political philosophy. Unsurprisingly, 
the legal debate on paternalism in the United States of America differs substantially 
from the debate in Europe,23 perhaps because individual autonomy and freedom of 
decision-making have deeper cultural and constitutional roots in the former compared 
to the latter.
15 However, care must be taken in using this argument, because, if, for example, curtailing smoking 
prolongs life, this can add to rather than diminish the health care costs borne by others.
16 Cf. Kennedy, above n. 5, at 633.
17 Zamir, above n. 1, at 229 ff.; A. Ogus, ‘The Paradoxes of Legal Paternalism and How to Resolve Them’ 
(2010) 30 Legal Studies 61 ff.
18 Cf. Kennedy, above n. 5, at 625.
19 Ogus, above n. 2, at 31, 227-228 and 252.
20 On the relationship between paternalism and (re)distributive justice, see Ogus, above n. 2, at 220.
21 Ogus, above n. 17, at 63.
22 Zamir, above n. 1, at 285.
23 See e.g. the (US) academic debate between O. Bar-Gill and R.A. Epstein, Consumer Contracts: 
Behavioral Economics vs. Neoclassical Economics (2007) at 1 ff.
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4 The Rotterdam Workshop
Participants at the Rotterdam Workshop were invited to relate their articles to the theme 
discussed above. In this section, we briefl y introduce their contributions to this and the 
next issue of the Erasmus Law Review.24
 In ‘Mandatory Contract Law: Functions and Principles in Light of the Proposal 
for a Directive on Consumer Rights’, Gerhard Wagner provides an overview of the 
relationship between autonomy and paternalism in contract law. From a comparative 
perspective, he fi nds it easier to locate a tradition of mandatory law (ius cogens) within 
the civil law culture than within that of common law. From the perspective of economic 
theory, he fi nds that strong justifi cations for mandatory law can be found, but not so 
easily in the case of paternalism. In the second half of the article, he discusses different 
instances of mandatory rules, considering justifi cations for them, particularly in the 
light of the proposed Directive on Consumer Rights, by reference to both paternalist 
protection and standardisation.
 By analysing ‘The Role of Information Defi ciencies in Contract Enforcement’, 
Ann-Sophie Vandenberghe essentially looks into the issue whether and to what extent 
duties to inform in contract law amount to paternalism. From the outset, it is clearly a 
diffi cult task to draw the line between information defi ciencies of which the law will 
take account and those which it will disregard. Vandenberghe sets out the economic 
framework for determining when it is appropriate to shift responsibility for information 
defi ciencies from one contracting party to the other. Moreover, she fi nds that intervention 
is warranted in cases where information defi ciencies interfere with a special relationship 
of trust between the contracting parties. It seems that, in these trust relationships, the 
mere duty to inform may transform into a duty to give advice and sometimes even 
to prevent unnecessary risk-taking. The economic justifi cation for and limitation of 
such duties and other regulatory interventions in the contracting process is to be found, 
Vandenberghe argues, in consumers’ tendency to ‘sign without reading’.
 In ‘Consumer Bankruptcy: A Third Way between Autonomy and Paternalism 
in Private Law’, Nick Huls links the friction between autonomy and paternalism to 
consumer bankruptcy, against the backdrop of the introduction of American ideas of 
consumer bankruptcy in European continental civil law systems. Huls analyses the 
history of ‘bankruptcy waves’ and refl ects on the next regulatory wave that the recent 
credit crisis can be expected to push forward. He then goes on to argue that consumer 
bankruptcy in Europe has evolved into an overt battleground for the competing interests 
of creditors and debtors.
 In ‘Regulating Consumer Demand in Insurance Markets’, Daniel Schwarcz 
concentrates on the problems of understanding consumer behaviour in relation to the 
choice of insurance contracts. Although he recognises that a limited understanding of 
the complexities involved in risk phenomena may justify interventionist measures by 
reference to paternalism, there is a need to develop a deeper understanding of the role 
that insurance plays in the emotional life of individuals. This topic has been neglected 
in the literature. Using examples, such as the demand for insurance against small risks 
and non-pecuniary losses or for excessively low deductibles, he speculates on how 
appropriately designed disclosure rules might succeed in discriminating between those 
individuals who make these choices as a result of cognitive errors and those who might 
have good emotional reasons for them.
 In issue 3:2 of the Erasmus Law Review, we will continue our exploratory expedition 
at the crossroads between autonomy and paternalism.
 In ‘Contracts and Capabilities: An Evolutionary Perspective on the Autonomy-
Paternalism Debate’, Simon Deakin, adopts a broad evolutionary theoretical approach 
to contracts. Drawing on the writings of Gintis, which foster such an approach, he 
considers that paternalism is only one strand in a more complex web of justifi cations 
for selectivity and discrimination in the enforcement of contracts. He argues that 
24 Note that the contributions of Wagner, Vandenberghe, Huls and Schwarcz appear in this issue of the 
Erasmus Law Review (3:1) and that the contributions of Waddams, Deakin, Bar-Gill & Ferrari and Winkel 
will appear in the next issue (3:2).
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capability theory provides a surer way of understanding interventionist measures than 
the autonomy-paternalism dichotomy, because, rather than concentrating exclusively 
on the individual and rationality, it takes account of the evolution of the market and its 
functions in promoting general welfare. In other words, it is necessary to understand the 
interaction between the dual systems of market and law in order to apply norms of societal 
coordination to contractual relationships. To illustrate this thesis, Deakin examines the 
history of labour law and the justifi cations for the regulation of employment contracts.
 The article by Stephen Waddams, ‘Autonomy and Paternalism from a Common 
Law Perspective: Setting Aside Disadvantageous Transactions’, explores the roots 
and developments of various doctrines protecting disadvantaged parties in the English 
law of contract, with some reference to the Draft Common Frame of Reference. He 
successively reviews the relevant principles, including those governing consideration, 
specifi c performance, relief of forfeiture in mortgages, penalty clauses, undue infl uence 
and unconscionability, and then considers possible rationalisations for them. He 
concludes that although autonomy and paternalism have been important factors, other 
considerations have infl uenced the courts, particularly public policy. Examples of this 
include considerations relating to the unreasonable restraint of trade, the requirement of 
legitimate interest to enforce contracts and, fi nally, the doctrine of unjust enrichment.
 In their contribution, entitled ‘Informing Consumers About Themselves’, Oren 
Bar-Gill and Franco Ferrari focus on mistakes typically made by consumers that are 
often invoked to justify paternalist interventions, both hard and soft. They argue that 
insuffi cient attention has so far been given to what they call ‘use-pattern mistakes’, i.e. 
mistakes that are made when consumers use products or services that are purchased. 
Such mistakes are often exploited by suppliers, leading to even greater losses. The 
authors discuss different methods of combating the problem and argue for better systems 
of mandatory disclosure, with suppliers being obliged to highlight information about 
aspects that are typically misperceived by consumers.
 Finally, in ‘Forms of Imposed Protection in Legal History, Especially in Roman 
Law’, Laurens Winkel traces the origins of paternalism back to early Roman family law 
in the so-called Twelve Tables. Indeed, several forms of imposed protection can be found 
in legislation concerning gifts, in decrees of the Senate and in praetorian legal remedies. 
Moreover, Winkel shows that contract law was also a source of protective measures, in 
so far as good faith played a role in this area, and that the concept of ‘mistake of law’ 
gave birth to special rules of paternalism. Winkel then addresses the wider reception of 
Roman law, concluding that, although the oldest forms of imposed protection are to be 
found in family law, the broad idea of protection has, from the Middle Ages onwards, 
gradually spread to all parts of patrimonial law in continental legal systems.
 Obviously, these fi ne contributions to the Erasmus Law Review do not provide 
a defi nitive answer to the ‘autonomy v. paternalism’ debate. What they do provide, 
however, is a thought-provoking addition to the debate and a deepened understanding 
of the considerations that underlie policy choices made in Europe and elsewhere in 
the private law domain and beyond. Finally, we would like to thank the contributors 
for the enjoyable discussions we had with them, the Erasmus School of Law research 
programme on Behavioural Approaches to Contract and Tort25 for hosting the Rotterdam 
workshop and, last but not least, the Erasmus Law Review for providing a much-
appreciated academic platform.
25 See: <http://www.behaviouralapproaches.eu>.

